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Sweden’s Secret Human Rights Violations: The Sámi Fight for the Right to Traditional Lands
I.

INTRODUCTION
All people should have a right to the land that is traditional theirs. This statement

includes indigenous peoples like the Sámi1 of Northern Europe. However, many indigenous
individuals do not have ownership rights to their lands. Even if the government hears their
voice, its merely in a cultural or linguistic sense. For instance, in the context of the Sámi of
Sweden; the Swedish government often does not consult the Sámi when the government wants
to use their traditional lands.
As it stands, the Swedish state is violating human rights norms. It's current domestic
polices, and international actions concerning the Sámi's right to their traditional land do not
comply with Art. 26 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Further, this consists of a breach of the customary international law norm of indigenous selfdetermination. Which is awarded by Art. 3 of the UNDRIP awards to indigenous people.
Although not a binding legal document, the UNDRIP is a codification of customary international
law. Sweden is also in violation of its obligations as a signatory to the Nordic Saami
Convention.
However, Sweden can remedy this breach. Firstly, Sweden must create domestic policies
to remedy this breach. There are three actions Sweden should take domestically;
(1) Provide the Sámi Parliaments with greater independence with greater financial
independence
(2) Create provisions within the Mineral Act to create an obligatory status for the duty to
consult; and
Either establish in its domestic Courts or implement legislation to lower the standard
of proof for establishing traditional ownership of land

1

Sámi and Saami are both correct spellings and are used interchangeably throughout the piece.

Secondly, Sweden must take two actions internationally to remedy its breach. The first action is
to sign and ascend to the International Labour Organisation Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention (ILO C169). The second action is to expedite the ratification process of the Nordic
Sami Convention.
1. The Sámi in Sweden
The Sámi are a group of indigenous people who live in Northern Fennoscandia and the
Kola Peninsula, in an area known as Sápmi. This area covers four countries; Norway, Sweden,
Finland, and Russia. Current population estimates put the Sámi at 65,000-100,0002 individuals,
throughout these four countries. However, this paper focuses explicitly on Sweden and the
relationship the Sámi share with the Swedish state. About 20,000 Sámi currently reside in
Sweden3.
The relationship that the Sámi share with Sweden is complicated. Their current status is
one of cultural and linguistic autonomy, without territorial or land ownership rights. Nor are the
Sami are not recognized explicitly within the Swedish constitution4. Instead, the Sami people are
"treated as an ethnic minority or as indigenous peoples"5 The “Samtingslag”6 grants the Sámi a
representative body in the form of a Parliament. The meaning of the law suggest that the Sami
Parliament should have the power over all work concerning a “living Sami culture taking
initiatives for activities proposing measures for promoting [their] culture”7. This power should

2

. The population numbers vary depending on each researcher.
SAMI IN SWEDEN, https://sweden.se/society/sami-in-sweden/ (last updated Feb. 7, 2020)
4
.Timo Koivurova, The Draft for a Nordic Saami Convention, 6 EURO. YEARBOOK OF MINORITY ISSUES, 103, 103
(2008)
5
Id. at 104
6
Translated from the Swedish, it reads "Sámi Parliament Act."
7
Sametingslag [The Sami Parliament Act] Ch. 2 §1¶1 (SFSR 1992:1433) (the Swedish law establish the Swedish
Sámi parliament), (Original text is in Swedish – Unofficial translation by Sametinget.se)
3
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include "participating in community development and ensuring the Sami's needs are considered,
including the interests . . . in the use of land and water"8.
However, in actual practice, the Sámi Parliament's power is only over cultural matters.
The Swedish Sámi Parliament's power is best described as similar to the power of a
governmental agency9. It is hugely dependent on measures by the Swedish government. It lacks
control of “all to the majority of all governmental spending on Sami specific issues”10. Often the
Sámi Parliament falls to "victim to power-play between the Sámediggi11 and the government”12.
As a result, the Sámi Parliament cannot independently "design [its] own priorities, long-term
plans, and projects"13
2. Existing Scholarly Work
This piece comes as an update to the scholarly work done by others. The realm of
indigenous rights to development is a new and developing one. However, it is a robust realm.
The current consensus is that “there has been a great deal of progress at the international level in
this area.”14 Examples include reassurances about the importance of the implementation of the
UNDRIP by petroleum companies15. There also have been negotiations to create something akin
to the Nordic Sami Convention16. There is also a growing number of successful litgations for

Sametingslag. at ¶4. (Original text is in Swedish – Unoffical translation by Sametinget.se)
Adam Stępień, Anna Petrétei, and Timo Koivurova, Sámi Parliaments in Finland, Norway, and Sweden in
MANGANG DIVERSITY THROUGH NON-TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY: ASSESSING ADVANTAGES, DEFICIENCIES, AND
RISKS. (Tove H. Malloy, Alexander Osipov, and Balázs ed.) 128 -130 (2105)
10
Id.
11
The Swedish Name for the Sámi Parliament
12
Stepień, Petrétei and Koivurova, supra 128-130
13
Id.
14
Lee Swepston, Indigenous Peoples in International Law and Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 53 -65, (Joshua Castelino and Niemh Walsh ed., 2004)
15
Kristy Kirkup, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers reaffirms pledge to Indigenous rights amid
concerns”, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, April 28, 2020
16
Ashely Wadhwani, Wet’suwet’en agree to sign memorandum on rights to title with B.C., Ottawa, THE
CHILLWACK PROGRESS, April 28, 2020
8
9
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indigenous peoples; both in land use17 and fishery rights18. However, on the domestic level,
"indigenous peoples continue to suffer from the pressure of encroaching dominant cultures"19.
This piece attempt to enter this realm of indigenous development rights by presenting an update
on the work of individuals like Timo Koivurova, Rasmus Kløcker Larsen, and many more.
Instead of taking a multi-country approach like other scholars, this piece chooses to focus
specifically on , the Sámi in Sweden. The most recent article concerning the Sámi’s relationship
with the Swedish State comes from January 2019 and focuses on the Swedish “State’s Duty to
Consult”20. However, this piece focuses almost exclusively domestic sphere. Specifically, the
article focuses on creating an " empirical assessment of the views of indigenous communities
and state officials . . . on the prospect of enacting the state duty to consult indigenous
communities [and] ensure effective participation in decision making"21
Furthermore, much of the policy work done with the Sámi's situation references Special
Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples Anaya's report from 201122. Primarly this work
focuses on domestic policy changes or regional changes. Secondly there is an update report from
2015 from the current Special Rapporteur Victoria Tauli Corpuz. Very little scholarly work
exists around this report, most of it focus on Anaya’s 2011 report.

Accord Prosper Petroleum Ltd. v. Alberta, (2020) A.J. No. 250 (Can. Alb. C.A.) and Bob Weber, Alberta’s top
court overturns oilsands project approval over Aboriginal concerns, THE CANADIAN PRESS, April 24, 2020
18
See Commonwealth v. Yarmirr; Yarmir v. Northern Territory BC990788 [1999] FCA 1668 (Dec 3, 1995) (Austl.)
19
Id.
20
Rasmus Kløcker Larsen and Kaisa Ratio, Implementing the State Duty to Consult in Land and Resource
Decisions: Perspectives from Sami Communities and Swedish State Officials, 10 ARCTIC R. ON L. AND POL., 4
(2019)
21
Id. at 16
22
Marget Carstens, Sami land rights: the Anaya Report and the Nordic Sami Convention, 15. J. ON ETHNO. AND
MINORITY ISSUS IN EURO. 75 (2016)
17
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Also much of the international scholarly work focuses upon the Nordic Sami Convention.
There has been an exploration of the effect of this convention on self-determination23. Other
works explore the effects of this convention on Sami identity and indigenous status. Even more
works explore the relationship between the convention and the 2011 report by the Special
Rapporteur play24. There is also some work done with the convention’s effects on the land right
This paper wants to take existing scholarly work and connect it all together and expand it to
include the 2015 report.. From this place of connection, it wants to argue a grant of selfdetermination to the Sámi grants certain land rights, citing to the work of Rasmus Larsen, and
Marget Carstens and others. It then intends make a case to strength accountable measures for
Sweden.
3. The Argument
This paper separates its argument into three sections; the first a brief summary of d the
international law in question, the second a exploration of Sweden’s violative actions and the
reasons why the actions are violative, the final section remedies Sweden can take to fix its
violative actions and why such remedies are necessary.
In its section on international law, this paper contends the Sámi are owed a right of selfdetermination and through that certain land rights. Firstly, it argues that self-determination is a
jus cogens norm. It then argues that self-determination includes certain rights, include that of
certain land ownership rights. It then applies this is the context of indigenous individuals rights;
referencing Canadian and Norwegian practice self-determination indicate customary law.
Finally, it applies this argument to the Sámi in Sweden; arguing that certain treaties Sweden

Adrain Liviu Ivan and Ruzandra Emanuela Nut, Sami People and the Right to Self-Determination, 9 SOC’Y AND
POL. 30 (2015)
24
Carstens supra 75
23
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signed on to and General Assembly resolutions require that Sweden supports Sweden guarantee
these rights.
The second section of this piece specifically addresses Sweden’s violative actions. It
argues that Sweden is violating international law, by impugning on Sami’s right to their
traditional lands grant by the economic development prong the Sámi’s right to selfdetermination. It separates into two subsections; international actions and domestic actions. On
an international stage, this paper argues that Sweden is violating certain provision of the UNDIP.
It also argues that Sweden is violating its obligations as a signatory to the Nordic Sami
Convention. It then addresses Sweden’s domestic actions. It argues that the Sámi Parliament
doesn’t have enough independence to be able to exercise its self-determination rights. It also
argues, that the Mineral Act doesn’t afford enough protection to Sámi economic development
rights. Finally, it argues that the traditional land status is to of a high burden, preventing exercise
of Sámi rights.
The third section discusses remedy. It presents three sets of remedies that Sweden needs
to take. The first set of remedies are domestic. It argues that Sweden needs to strength the
independence of the Sámi Parliament in order to allow the Sámi a proper representative body to
exercise their rights of self-determination. It also suggest that Sweden amend it’s existing
Mineral Act to include an explicit provision about mining companies duty to consult, if they seek
to mine in Sámi traditional lands. It also argues for explicit changes in the traditional land status
burden on the Sámi.
Secondly, it argues for Sweden to become a party to the ILO C169. If Sweden becomes a
party to the convention, that it will have binding obligations concerning its treatment of its
indigenous population, i.e. the Sámi. Currently, Sweden only has obligations as a signatory to

6

the Nordic Sami Convention. The only obligation Sweden has as a signatory is not to defeat the
obligation and purpose of this convention. However, Sweden has very broad discretion as to
what defeats the obligation and the purpose of this treaty. As a result, this paper argues having a
second set of obligations under the ILO C169, would specify the obligations that Sweden has. It
would help to define what actions Sweden more explicitly can and cannot take when deal with its
Sámi population.
Finally, the paper makes the argument that Sweden must ratify the Nordic Sami
Convention. This convention signed in 2017, more explicitly defines the rights the Sámi have
throughout the Nordic countries they live in. However, it’s ratification process has stalled. As a
signatory Sweden’s obligations under this treaty are not specific enough. Although, the Sámi
Convention has similar provisions as the ILO 169, it is more specific to the Sámi and their
situation. As a result, Sweden needs to become a ratified party to the convention and an
ascended party to the ILO 169. One protects the Sámi explicitly while the other aims to protect
all indigenous and tribal peoples. However, this paper argues that both are incredibly important
pieces of international law that Sweden needs to be a party too. If Sweden were a party to both,
then as this paper argues, it would be much clearer for Sámi individuals to know explicitly their
rights and have explicit accountability measures.
II.

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SAMI’S RIGHT TO SELF
DETERMINATION
International human rights support the Sámi's right to have authority over their

traditional lands. Firstly, international human rights law guarantees self-determination as jus
cogens norms. Self-determination has the status as a preemptive norm of customary
international law and this is codifed in multiple treaties. Secondly, this notion of self-

7

determination extends to indigenous populations. Customary international law and the
codification in General Assembly Resolutions. Such a notion is also supported in documetns like
the ILO C169 and the Nordic Saami Convention. Further, this right extends to the Sámi to
Sweden.
This section explicitly focus on the international law of the Sámi’s right to internal selfdetermination, including economic development and by extension land rights . Firstly, it
addresses the status of self-determination in international law. It argues that self-determination is
a jus cogens norms, of which no “derogation is permitted”25. It provides evidence from in cases
and human rights treaties. It then extends this argument to argue that there is a customary
international norm that indigenous peoples have self-determination rights too. To support this
contention, the paper cites to practices from Canada and Norway. It also mentions treaties and
General Assembly Resolution to suggest a codification and acceptance of this notion. Finally, it
addresses this notion of indigenous self-determination in the context of the Sámi in Sweden.
Citing to the Nordic Sami Convention, and the UNDRIP it argues that Sweden has an obligation
to award the Sámi self-determination rights include land rights which are extension of the Sámi’s
right to economic development, a prong of the Sámi’s internal self-determination rights. It then
refutes the notion that the Sámi have effective representation and have no need for selfdeterminaton rights.
1. Self Determination Is A Jus Cogens Norms
International law derives its binding power from four major sources:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
25
26

internal conventions
international custom or customary international law
general principles of law
judicial decisions and teachings of international law scholars26.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 56, May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]
Statue of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Sat. 1055, 993 U.N.T.S.
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This paper focus primarily on customary international law. A norm becomes a tenant of
customary international law when it is the general practice of the majority of states, and it has
opinio juris or acceptance as law27.
A certain number of these norms have become so accepted and are so preemptory that
they have become known as jus cogens. The Vienna Convention on the Law Treaties defines a
jus cogens as:
a peremptory norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only be a subsequent norm of general international law have the same character28.
These are norms that can void treaties and other norms of customary international law29. It is
unclear exactly which norms are considered jus cogens. However, the international law
community universally agrees that eight norms are jus cogens:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)

the prohibition of aggressive use of force;
the right to self-defense;
the prohibition of genocide;
the prohibition of torture;
crimes against humanity;
the prohibition of slavery and the slave trade;
the prohibition of piracy;
the prohibition of racial discrimination; and
the prohibition of hostilities directed at civilian population30.

However, there is a potential ninth jus cogens norm which is the right to selfdetermination. Though controversial, there is enough existing international legal jurisprudence to
establish that self-determination is a norm that has risen to the level of jus cogens norms. Firstly,

The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. V. Turk.), Judgement, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
VCLT, art. 56
29
Id. at art. 53
30
Rep. of the Study Group of Int’l Law Comm’n on Fragmentation of International Law; Difficulties Arising from
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/C/N.4/L.682 at ¶374 (2006)
27
28
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there is customary international law almost no derivations that sets self-determination as a norm.
Secondly, multiple treaties codify this custom.
Sell-determination of peoples is historic and codified in customary international law.
Scholars define it differently. However, a accepted definition is that self-determination is “a
fundamental right of all people to decide their own political status and to freely pursues their
own, economic and social development”31. Treaties like the International Covenant on Economic
on Social, Cultural, Rights also provide definitions. Furthermore, self-determination is an
expanding right32. It has been present in some form throughout history. Initially, it only
belonged to decolonized persons33. Now, the definition of the self-determination right includes
"groups that are not necessarily representative of the majority in a territory or lives [in] the
territory of several states"34.
There are two dimensions to a people’s self-determination: internal and external35.
Internal self-determination gives peoples decision-making rights in decisions that directly affect
the said people's populations36. External gives peoples the rights to establish “international
connections”37 Both are important to people's self-determination right. Courts have explored
both dimensions in cases involving East Timor, Palestine, and Quebec, among others. The
dimension at issue here is the internal dimension of the Sámi’s right over land where they live.
Overall, courts indicate a belief that “the principle of self-determination of peoples” is
enshrined among international conventions and customary law38. The courts indicate a further

31

Ivan and Nut, supra 30
Id.
33
Id. at 31
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Legal Consequences of the Construction of A Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
!.C.J. 136 ¶ 88 (July 9)
32
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belief that the "sacred trust" of the Covenant of League of Nations "was . . . selfdetermination"39. Often court practice can indicate customary practice of international law. In
other words, most states customarily accept respect for people's self-determination. Further, they
suggest that self-determination has achieved the necessary opino juris. It is a practice that, as
mentioned above, is enshrined in legally binding documents, which means states act in this
manner because they believe it has binding legal authority. Such legal binding documents
include the U.N. Charter.
Along with the U.N. Charter, many human rights treaties explicitly state the right to selfdetermination. The U.N. Charter reads in Art. 1, obligates a "respect for the principles of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples”40. The International Covenant on Economic on Social,
Cultural Rights also reads, "all peoples have the right of self-determination"41. As a result, it is
a norm that readily codified in treaties. Often treaties can be evidence of codification of
customary international law norms.
2. Indigenous Individuals Have A Right to Self-Determination
The right to self-determination extends to indigenous individuals, like the Sámi as well.
Firstly, customary international law establishes this as a norm. There are several historical
instances of indigenous peoples having both internal and external self-determination. Such
examples include historical recognition of First Nation treaties in Canada and Sámi land
ownership recognition in Norway.

39

Legal Consequences for the States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Resolution 276 (1970) Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971 p. 31 paras 52 -53.) quoted
in Id.
40
UN Charter, art. 1, ¶ 2
41
International Covenant on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights, art. 1¶1, Dec 16, 1969, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
ICESCR]; see also International Covenant on Cultural, Civil, and Political Rights art. 1. ¶ 1("all peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development.)
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Evidence of external self-determination for indigenous can be found during colonization
period of Canada where indigenous individuals conducted treaties among themselves and
colonial powers; an example being the Wabanaki Confederacy42. This confederacy was
composed of four distinct indigenous nations43. External self-determination is found in the
ability to conduct such treaties44. Therefore, there is evidence of these nations have selfdetermination and recognition of such45. Furthermore, there was some recognition of this
external self-determination by European powers46. Examples of such recognition include a set of
“ Peace and Friendship Treaties” between the British and these indigenous populations47. These
said treaties were respected with legal authority suggest opinio juris status for this ability.
Internal self-determination can be found in Nordic regional practice, one only has to look
at Norway and its recognition of the internal self-determination of their Sámi population.
Norway currently has a population of about 40,000 Sámi individuals48. Akin to the Sámi in
Sweden, the Sámi also have parliament in Norway. However, this parliament is a much stronger
body than its Swedish equivalent49. It is a “significant channel for Sámi postulates”50. The
Sámediggi in Norway has the “autonomous power[s of] protection of cultural heritage, drawing .
. . Sámi teaching plans, and . . .right[s] to object to the Planning and Building Act”51 The powers
granted to Sámediggi indicate that the Sámi have the power over “decision-making …

42

Robert Hamilton, Indigenous Legal Traditions and Histories of International and Transnational Law in the PreConfederation Maritime Provinces, in REFLECTIONS ON CANADA’S PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW/RÉFLEXIONS SUR LE PASSÉ, LE PRÉSENT ET L’AVENIR DU CANADA EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL. 145-145
(Oonagh E. Fitzgerald, Valerie Hughes, and Mark Jeweet (eds) 2018)
43
Id.
44
Ivan and Nut, supra at 30
45
Hamiltion, supra at 146
46
Id. at 154
47
Id.
48
THE SAMI – INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF NORTH, https://nordnorge.com/en/tema/the-sami-are-the-indigenous-peopleof-the-north/ (accessed April 30, 2020)
49
Stępień, Petrétei and Koivurova, supra at 136
50
Id. at 141
51
Id. at 142
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concerning [their] populations”52. Furthermore, Norway is a ratified party to the ILO 169. These
actions and practices indicate the respect that Norway has for its Sámi populations and their
rights to internal self-determination and the belief that Norway has of its legal obligations to
respect the Sámi internal self-determination.
These rights are also present in resolutions and treaties. Though not binding, the
UNDRIP reads, “indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination”53. Therefore, “by
virtue of that right they [can] freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”54.
It doesn't explicitly define what these development rights. However, it does "require that
indigenous peoples participative effectively in the exercise and implementation of the right to
development"55 Scholars indicate that this includes "the right to land."
Furthermore, the ILO 169 codifies these ideas in a binding document. However, the
problem with ILO 169 is the fact that it is only binding on a few countries, Sweden not included.
It is an essential treaty in the context of aboriginal rights work. It doesn't explicitly discuss selfdetermination rights. Instead, it explains and defines what are considered developmental and land
rights for indigenous peoples.

However, these are rights are not without limits. Many

aboriginal rights including the right to development are “young” rights56. They are not in the
principal “human rights instruments” or often explored in older cases57. Therefore, it is harder to
establish their status as customary. Further compounded this issue is that there is ”no general

52

Ivan and Nut, supra 60
G.A. Res. 61/295, "United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples," art. 3 (Sept. 13, 2007)
[hereinafter UNDRIP]
54
Id.
55
George Pring and Susan Y. Noé, The Emerging international Law of Public Participation, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF MINING AND
ENERGY RESOURCES. 11– 60-61 ( Donald N. Zillman, Alastair R. Lucas and Georg (Rock) Pring (eds) 2002) quoted
in Kristian Myntti, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Participate in Development Projects, HUM. RTS. DEV. Y.B.
230 (2002)
56
Id. at 227
57
Id.
53
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agreement on the substance of the right to development” or a universal endorsement58. As a
result, there is not widespread practice surrounding this rights making it harder to prove
customary international status.
3. The Swedish Sámi’s Right to Self-Determination.
As a member of the U.N. General Assembly, who subscribes to the UNDRIP, Sweden's
Sami should have the rights provided for in the UNDRIP. As an indigenous population, the Sami
are within the purview of the UNDRIP. These rights include self-determination and by
extension land rights59. Furthermore ,these are customary international law norms. Often
General Assembly resolutions are representative of customary international law.
Furthermore, the Nordic Sami Convention, which Sweden is a signatory, provides for
self-determination rights, including rights to their traditional land. Under international law, a
state has an "obligation not to defeat the direction and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into
force"60 In other words, Sweden must "refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose" of the convention even though the Nordic Sami Convention is yet to be ratified61.
Therefore, if this treaty says that Sámi should have rights to self-determination and the ability to
have land rights, then Sweden cannot take actions that would deny them these rights.
However, there is an argument that the Sámi do not have self-determination rights
because they have effective representative in the Swedish government. International law
jurisprudence does indicate self-determination rights are limited62. The Canadian Supreme Court
finds such in Reference Re Secession of Quebec63. The Court suggest that there is a “right of

58

Id. at 228
UNDRIP at Art. 3
60
VCLT at art. 18
61
Id. at art. 18 ¶1
62
Accord Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶126 (Can.)
63
Id.
59
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colonial peoples to exercise the right to self-determination”64. However, it places restrictions
upon these self-determination rights65. Instead, the Court finds self-determination contingent
upon a “denial [of] access to government”66. In other words, a people are only entitled a right to
“external self-determination because they have been denied the ability to exert internally their
right to self-determination”67
Yet this is not the case for the Sámi. Firstly, most of the Sámi are not seeking external
self-determination. Instead, they want to live within Swedish borders, while still have their
traditional lands respected. In others words the Sámi are seeking increased internal selfdetermination. The Quebecers specifically wanted external self-determination not internal68.
Secondly, the Sámi do not have the same amount of access to the Swedish government that the
Quebecers had to the Canadian government69. The Quebecers are “equitably represented [in]
legislative, executive and judicial institutions70” This is not the case for the Sámi71. As
mentioned above, the Sámi Parliament is a weak non-independent body that doesn’t allow
for“equitable representation”72. Furthermore, the Canadian Supreme Court indicates that in the
context of aboriginal interests that is a possibility for such external self-determination, even
though is not wanted by the Sámi. 73.
4. Conclusion

64

Id. at ¶132
Id. at ¶136
66
Id.
67
Id. at ¶138 (emphasis added)
68
Id.
69
Id. at ¶136
70
Id.
71
Stepień, Petrérei and Koivurova supra at 128-130.
72
Id. at ¶136
73
Id.
65
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There is clear support in international law for the Sámi right to traditional land
ownership. It is an extension of the economic development aspect of internal self-determination.
The right to said self-determination is a jus cogens norm, which when granted to indigenous
individuals reduces to a customary international law. As a result, there are obligations that
Sweden are not fufill.
III.

SWEDEN’S VIOLATIVE ACTIONS
Sweden's relationship with Sami is fraught with complications. However, that does not

excuse the fact that Sweden's actions are violative of international human rights law. Nor does it
excuse the fact that Sweden is violating its obligations under the Nordic Saami Convention. The
Nordic Saami Convention is the very regional treaty that protect the is intended Sámi rights,
include their right to land.
This section begins by arguing that Sweden is violating human right norms and treaty
obligations; both internationally and domestically. It goes on to show that in the international
context, Sweden is both violating customary international law and its obligations as a signatory
to the Nordic Saami Convention. By interfering with the Sámi right to their lands, Sweden is not
allowing the Sámi their self-determination rights. Sweden is also violating its obligations as a
signatory to the Nordic Saami Convention, by taking actions that defeat the object and the
purpose of the said Convention. Domestically, Sweden is preventing the Sámi Parliament from
become strong enough to protect the Sámi. It also argues that the Mineral Act doesn’t
adequately protect the Sámi interest and that current legal burden on the Sámi is high enough to
prevent the Sámi from accessing the courts.
1. International Actions

16

Current actions taken by Sweden are violative of international law in the form of the
UNDRIP. The activities are also violative of the Nordic Sami Convention, indicating treaty
obligation breaches. The UNDRIP reflects the growing notion that indigenous individuals have
specific rights granted to them. Sweden claims to be a subscriber to the thoughts in it. Yet many
of Sweden's actions are violative of many of the provisions in this particular resolution. As of
January 2017, Sweden is also a signatory to the Nordic Sami Convention, and has resulting
obligations. Sweden is not living up to these obligations. Instead, their actions defeat the purpose
and object of the Nordic Sami Convention74.
The article of the UNDRIP that Sweden is violating is Article 26. Article 26 states:
(i) indigenous people have the right to the lands territories and resources which they have
traditionally owned, occupied, or otherwise used or acquired.
(ii)indigenous people have the right to own use, develop, and control the lands,
territories, and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other
traditional occupation or use, as well as those, which they have otherwise acquired.
(iii) States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, terrorists, and
resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions
and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned75.
Art. 26 deals explicitly with indigenous rights to land. As a result, Sweden's violative actions
concern their treatment of Sámi lands. Many of Sweden's activities fail to give legal recognition
to the land rights of the Sámi. Or, if Sweden recognizes the Sámi rights, they block legal access
to them.
These actions also violate the obligations that Sweden has under the Nordic Saami
Convention. By signing on to this convention, Sweden has responsibilities to the language of the
treaty. However, these obligations are vastly different from what their duties are as a ratified
party. As a signatory, Sweden only has to conduct actions that do not defeat the object and

74
75

VCCT at art. 18
UNDRIP at art. 26

17

purpose of the treaty76. By denying the legal rights to the land, Sweden is defeating the purpose
of specific provisions of the Convention. The particular provisons are Art. 34 and 35 which, as
discussed below, award specific rights to the Sámi concerning the use of their traditional lands.
2. Domestic Actions
Many of Swedish domestic projects including mining, fail "to include . . . meaningful
participation of indigenous peoples"77. Firstly, the Sámi Parliament is a weak body that has an
influence that "does not resemble legal and constitutional provisions"78. Furthermore, their status
as an "elected representative body" is undermined due to their position as a "simultaneous
administrative arm of a government"79. This position undermines Sámi self-determination and
participation.
Secondly, the Mineral Act provides little to no requirements for mining companies to
consult with the Sámi populations when the companies seek to mine in traditional Sámi lands.
This lack of conditions is in clear violation of multiple articles of the UNDRIP. The most
relevant of which is Article 27 which states that
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned,
a fair, independent, impartial, open, and transport process, giving due recognition to
indigenous peoples' laws, traditions, and resources, including those which were
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the
right to participate in this process.
The Mineral Act of 1991 is one of the two pieces of legislation that governs Sweden's
mining system80. The other is the Mineral Ordinance passed in 199281. Both describe the
process and restrictions on mining in Sweden. However, the ordinance focuses more on the
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procedure of applying for an exploration permit, a requirement for many mining operations in
Sweden82. The relevance of mining to the Sámi is paramount. Most of the mining operation in
Sweden takes place in Northern Sweden in what would be considered Sápmi.
However, neither piece of legislation explicitly mentions the Sámi or procedures allowing
Sámi access block to mining contracts. The closest provision that may allow for Sámi access to
the process is Section 4: "The right to undertake exploration and exploitation" of the Mineral
Act83.

Paragraph 2 provides in part that “ exploration may, however, be undertaken without a

permit by (1) the property owner or, with his consent, another person”84 But this paragraph is
circumvented by paragraph 1 of the same provision, which indicates that "exploration may only
be undertaken by the holder of an exploration permit"85
On the papers, a company could receive an exploration permit if it consulted the owners
of the said property and got their consent. However, in many cases of involving the Sámi, this
process does not take place. Instead, the Sámi's receive notice of the prospective project, long
after the company receives the exploration permit and when objections would have effect.
The Sámi have tried to fight this, but the burden of proof for traditional ownership is
high. Also, very little money is provided to the Sámi to prove their claims86. Many Sámi have
tried "unsuccessfully to get financing for their campaign"87. Often as part of their claims, they
have to "pay large amounts of money for environmental impact assessments' create barriers to
court access88.
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3. Conclusion
Overall, Sweden’s actions indicate a breach of international law. Sweden is breaching it is
obligations under customary international law. It is also breaching its treaty obligations under the
Nordic Saami Convention. These actions taken are both international and domestic.
Internationally, Sweden is taking the necessary steps to create codified binding obligations of the
customary international law principles it claims to subscribe to. Domestically, Sweden is
preventing Sámi exercise of rights in clear violation.
IV.

THE REMEDY
In 2015, the Special Rapporteur on the Right of the Indigenous Peoples published a

report concerning the human rights situation of the Sami people in the Sápmi region of Norway,
Sweden, and Finland. As part of her report on the situation, she recommended that Sweden
reform isSami Parliament. She suggested the new Parliament have “greater independence from
State institutions and authorities”89 She also recommended that Sweden enact legislation to
"revisit the high burden of proof to establish traditional Sami rights to land” and revise the
current Mineral Acts to ensure compliance with international human rights”90.
This paper recommends somethings similar in terms of domestic measures. However, it
goes a step further by suggesting international actions for Sweden to take. It should sign and
ascend to the ILO C169. Sweden should also expedite the process of ratifying the Nordic Sami
Convention. As a result, Sweden would have obligations codified in a binding document that
currently exists in a non-binding resolution and in treaty signatory obligations.
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This section begins by arguing for three domestic measures and two international
measure. Domestically, this section argues that Sweden needs to strength the independence of
the Sámi Parliament. It also argues for a provision in the Mineral Act, that would codify and
create legal obligations for mining companies to consult with the Sámi. The final domestic
measure argued for a change to the traditional land status legal burden.
On the international stage, this section argues that Sweden should become a party to the
ILO Convention 169 and expedite the process for ratification of the Nordic Sami Convention. It
argues for international action because it creates accountability for Sweden beyond domestic
courts. It argues this is a necessity because domestic courts may have implicit bias that
international courts may not have. The section further shows that it is important for Sweden to
become a party to both conventions because one covers indigenous rights as a whole and the
other specifically covers Sámi rights. Both create binding obligations on Sweden concerning
their treatment of the Sámi’s economic development prong of self-determination, and its
resulting extension to land rights.
1. Domestic Measures
As described by the Special Rapporteur, Sweden must do three things domestically to
comply with international human rights law:
(1) Strengthening Sami Parliamentary independence by removing its dependence on a
government grant of a budget.
(2) Add provisions to the Mineral Act to provide legal obligations for the duty to consult
(3) Pass a new piece of legislation or through legal jurisprudence, reduce the burden of
proof for Sámi's attempt to prove claims to traditional lands.
If Sweden were to take these steps, it would begin a process domestically of increasing
recognition for the Sámi rights. It is also possible that a beginning on a domestic sphere would
pressure Sweden to take action on an international stage.
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The first measure Sweden should take is to strengthen the Sámi Parliament's
Independence. Although the Sámi have an independent Parliament; it is a weak body. It is more
like a governmental agency, then an actually representative body91. Part of the reason for this is
the lack of independence the Sami Parliament has over its budget and ability to contribute to
budget discussions about things effecting the Sámi population. A first step towards giving this
independence to the Sámi Parliament and the Sámi by extension is to grant them their own
independent budget. This grant would also include the ability to make decisions concerning
financial matters affecting the Sámi populations.
By granting the Sámi Parliament financial independence, it would remove them from the
interference of the Swedish government. It would also prevent them from being undermined by
the politics of the Swedish government. The Swedish government does not always have the best
interest of the Sámi, at its heart.
The second measure Sweden should take is to revise the Mineral Acts to add a provision
explicitly protecting Sámi rights. This provision would contain language explicitly reading that
mining companies would need to consult with and obtain the consent of the Sámi population
when on Sámi lands, before receiving an exploration permit. It would also provide measures for
the Sámi to access the legal system including financial resources if violations occur.
By having an explicit provision like this, mining companies could no longer get away
with only providing notice to the Sámi. Instead, there would be explicit legal obligations to
consult and obtain consent and legal consequences if violations occur. Also, the "duty to
consent" doctrine would exist in Swedish domestic law. In other words, Swedish domestic law
would have language codifying legal requirements on mining companies concerning Sámi rights.
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A final measure for Sweden to take is to pass new legislation or establish new legal
jurisprudence around a different traditional land status standard. It should also increase financial
resources provided for these claims. Perhaps Sweden could implement a rule where to prove
traditional ownership, they wouldn’t have to look as far back or look at population numbers. In
other words, Sweden needs to establish a standard that is feasible for the Sámi to prove their
claims. Sweden also needs to create access for the Sámi to financial resources that would allow
them actually to bring claims to court. Often the Sámi do not bring these types of claims because
they lack the financial resources to be able to bring such claims.
The creation of a new standard can be accomplished either through changed legal
jurisprudence or passing new legislation expressly addressing this issue. It would be better to
codify this standard in a piece of legislation explicitly. However, judicial decisions reflecting the
change would also be okay. By creating a new standard, Sweden indicates its willingness to
accept the notion of a Sámi claim to the land. It allows for Sámi to gain actual access to the
courts. It also indicates a shift in the way Sweden would view Sámi's right to development.
2. Signing and Ascend to the International Labour Organization’s Indigenous and
Tribal People’s Convention (ILO C169)
However, domestic measures are not enough. If Sweden were only to take domestic
measures, it would mean that the Sámi would not have international means of protecting their
rights. In other words, if Sweden were to derogate from these domestic measures, there would
be very few measures to hold Sweden accountable. The Sámi would have to use domestic courts,
which could be problematic due to the possible implicit bias against the Sámi in Swedish courts.
Instead, Sweden needs to take steps to make itself accountable on the international stage and to
become compliant with international human rights law. Currently, Sweden subscribes to the
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UNDRIP, an non-binding resolution. That is why Sweden needs to sign and ascend to the ILO
C169.
The ILO C169 is a convention adopted in June of 1989. It protects indigenous peoples
and their rights. Currently, it only has 23 signatures, of which only one is a Sámi home country
(Norway).

The convention’s purpose among is to “recognis[e] the aspirations of [indigenous]

people to exercise control over their institutions, way of life and economic development"92.
It consists of 10 Parts;
Part I. General Policy: Art. 1 - Art. 12
Part II. Land: Art.13 - Art. 19
Part III. Recruitment and Conditions of Employment: Art. 20
Part IV. Vocational Training, Handicrafts, and Rural Industries: Art. 21 – 23
Part V. Social Security and Health: Art. 24-25
Part VI. Education and Means of Communication: Art. 26 – Art. 31
Part VII. Contacts and Co-operation: Art. 32
Part VIII. Administration: Art. 33
Part IX. General Provisions: Art. 34 – 35
Part X. Final Provisions – Art. 36 – 4493
The relevant part is Part II. Specifically, the related articles are Art. 12, 14, and 15. Art. 12
requires legal safeguards for indigenous peoples "against the abuse of their rights' and allows
them the "right take legal proceedings . . . for the effective protection of these rights"94.
Art. 14 protects “the rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over
the lands which they traditionally occupy”95. It includes recognition rights and obligations for
the government to take “steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned
traditionally occupy and to guarantee effective protection” of these rights96. These obligations
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include establishing “adequate procedures . . . within the national legal system to resolve land
claims by the peoples concerned97.
Art. 15 reads similar to Art. 14.. However, it explicitly references "the rights of people
concerned to the natural pertaining to their lands"98. Like Art. 14, it requires special safeguards
for these rights99. These safeguards are even more critical in countries where the “State retains
the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources rights”100. In such cases, “governments shall
establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples”101.
The ILO C169 is a vital convention that has very little support behind it. Therefore, if
Sweden were to accede to it, it would strengthen its legitimatization. More importantly, it would
place Sweden under binding obligation that under the principle of "pacta sunt servanda” they
would have to perform it in good faith102. This obligation means that Sweden would have to
change its current policy since, current policy violates provisions of the ILO C169 and internal
law is not an excuse to violate international law obligations103.
It means that the Sámi would have a binding legal document protecting their rights.
Currently, the Sámi do not have such a document. Instead, they rely upon the UNDRIP, which is
non-binding or upon weak treaty signature obligations. Or they rely on Swedish legislation,
which is not favorable towards the Sámi or their claims. A document like the ILO C169, would
also strengthens Sámi's claim to self-determination and their right to development.
3. Expediting The Nordic Sami Convention
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Even if Sweden does ascend to ILO C169, it must expedite the process to ratify the
Nordic Sami Convention. Throughout history “the Saami have not been treated as a people of
equal value and have thus been subjected to injustice”104. As a remedy, the Nordic Sami
Convention seeks to grant the Sami the equal status denied to them. This status includes
expanding cultural rights, civil rights, linguistic rights, and, most importantly, for this paper, land
and developmental rights.
The Nordic Sami Convention was the “work of an Expert Committee . . . [where] the
Saami representation was intensive ”105. The process began with the idea of a Saami Convention
in 1995106. This idea led to the creation of a working group established in 1996107. This group
contained representatives from three Nordic states and each of the three Sámi parliaments108. It
completed its work in 1998109. This group led to an Expert Committee formed in 2000110. It was
signed on January 13 of 2017 by all three countries111. However, since the creation of the draft
convention, the process of ratification has only begun.
Organizational wise, the Nordic Sami Convention is organized in the following manner;
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)

Preface
Chapter 1: The general rights of the Saami people: Art. 1 – Art.13
Chapter II: Saami governance: Art. 14 – Art. 22
Chapter III: Sami language and culture: Art. 23 – Art. 33
Chapter IV: Saami's right to land and water: Art. 34 – Art. 40
Chapter V: Saami livelihoods: Art. 41 – Art. 43
Chapter VI: Implementation and development of the Convention: Art. 44 –
Art. 47
h) Chapter VII: Final provisions: Art. 48 – Art. 51
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The two chapters this paper focuses on are Chapter Iand Chapter II. Specifically, this
paper focuses on Art. 3, 34, and 35. Art. 3 states that
as a people, the Saami has the right of self-determination in accordance with the rules
and provisions of international law and of this Convention. In so far as it follows from
these rules and regulations, the Saami people have the right to determine its own
economic, social and cultural development and to dispose of, to their own benefit, over
its own natural resources112.
Art. 34 describes the traditional use of land and water for the Saami. It reads
[p]roacted traditional use of land of the land areas constitutes for the basis for individual
or collective ownership rights to these areas for the Saami in accordance with national or
international norms concerning protected usage.
If the Saami, without being deemed to be the owners, occupy, and have traditionally used
certain land or waters areas for reindeer husbandry, hunting, fishing or in other ways,
they shall have the right to continue and occupy and use these areas to the same extent as
before. . .
The provisions of this article shall not be construed as to imply any limitation in the right
to restitution of property that the Saami might have under national or international law113.
Finally, Art. 35 describes the protections awarded to the Saami traditional lands and water. It
reads
The states shall take adequate measures for effective protection of Saami rights pursuant
to article 34. To that end, the states shall particularly identify the land and water areas
that the Saami traditionally use.
Appropriate procedures for examination of questions concerning Saami rights to land and
water shall be available under national law. In particular, the Saami shall have access to
such financial support that is necessary for them to be able to have their rights land and
water tried through legal proceedings114.
All three of these articles expand the reach of protections for the Saami beyond what the
ILO C169 grants. They would allow the Saami protection from the policies impairing their
traditional access to their natural resources. It is more explicit then ILO C169 when it speaks of
the protections that Saami should receive concerning their traditional land. The convention also
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gives more specific protective procedures then the ILO C169. Most importantly, it provides
explicitly that the Saami should have a voice concerning Saami's rights to land. It also defines
the type of traditional land standards that courts should use.
By signing on to this convention Sweden has obligations to fulfill the purpose of the
treaty. However, the duties Sweden has as signatory are different from what their ratification
obligations are. As a signatory, Sweden only has obligations not to conduct actions that do not
defeat the object and purpose of the treaty115. However what the object and purpose of a treaty is
up for the signatory to decide and what breaches it . However, as a party, Sweden would not be
able to wiggle out of its obligations as easily. Practically, it means that Sweden would have to
expedite the domestic measures described above. This expedition is important because internal
law cannot contradict international law and can be an excuse not to comply with international
law116.
4. Conclusion
All this measures would provide a means for the Sámi to have access to their internal selfdetermination land rights. Not only that but through the same means the Sámi can hold Sweden
accountable. Therefore, it is important for Sweden to implement all these measures. It provides
a signal both to the Sámi and the rest of world. It signals to the Sámi a new era of protection and
to the world a new era for indigenous rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

1. Effect on Sweden
Currently, Sweden's actions are violative of many developing human rights norms,
primarily the right to land and the right to development. Part of the reason Sweden continues to
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act like this is the lack of accountability. As it stands, Sweden has very few binding obligations
to respect the Sámi claims upon their traditional lands. Sweden only has to recognize the notion
in customary international law that indigenous peoples have rights to self-determination and the
obligations placed upon as a signatory to the Nordic Sami Convention.
These obligations mean that Sweden had discretion in is implement of the right to land.
They can give the pretext that they are fluffing their current commitments. They claim that they
respect the "duty to consult" and allow the Sámi access to courts. However, the "duty to consult"
is not enforceable upon companies and is easy to circumvent. Also, the courts place high burdens
on the Sámi and often fail to provide the Sámi with the financial resources necessary to be able
to defend their claims, create barriers to court access.
However, if Sweden were to take the actions recommended in this paper, then the Sámi
would have more protections. Firstly, the domestic measures recommended would allow the
Sámi more protection over their land rights, especially in the context of mining. Secondly, by
creating or changing current legislation concerning the standard of proofs and financial
resources, it gives Sámi's real access to the courts,. But it is not enough for Sweden to take
domestic actions. Instead, the country must be accountable on an international stage as well to
prevent derogation from human rights norm.
This need for accountability is the reason Sweden must sign and ascend to the ILO C169
and expedite the process of ratification for the Nordic Sami Convention. Acceding to the ILO
C169 is a good step first for Sweden. It provides basic protections for indigenous populations.
However, it doesn't cover everything or creates strong enough protections. It is therefore
essential for Sweden to expedite the process of ratification for the Nordic Saami Convention.
The Nordic Saami Convention is a more robust treaty and provides for more explicit protection
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for the Saami. However, it is crucial for both agreements to be binding upon Sweden, since
Sweden's presence as a party on each would legitimize both.
2. Effect on the World
What the situation of the Sami in Sweden indicates about the world that indigenous
peoples can gain developmental rights. If Sweden follows these recommendations, it will grant a
precedent that other countries could follow. This precedent is especially true of other Nordic
countries. It often happens when one Nordic country does something, another usually follows.
Norway has already ratified the ILO 169, and Finland is in the process of signing on and joining
the ILO 169. Both also are signatories to the Nordic Sami Convention, but none of the three
countries have ratified. Sweden’s actions would prompt change.
In a global context, Sweden's actions could set a precedent for other countries with
indigenous populations. However, the Sámi case could be distinguishable due to their status as a
population that live beyond territorial borders. Either way, the importance of what happens to
the Sámi is telling for what might happen to other indigenous communities. Hopefully, the
world will see the strides the Sámi are making in gaining their rights to the development and
recognition of their traditional lands and grant them to others.
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